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Abstract
Over the past 70 years civil wars have become the most common form of war.
Much time and thought has been devoted to understand why subnational groups fight.
Additionally, scholars have long analyzed the so-called “resource curse”, whereby states
with high levels of natural resources may tend to experience violence. As levels of
globalized economic markets have proliferated in this time too, it is important to
understand the relationship between foreign investment and war. Little research has been
done on the interaction between resource extraction, foreign investment, and subnational
conflict, especially using social identity formation as an analytical tool. This study
identifies social identity formation as a possible causal mechanism of ethnic conflict and
assesses whether foreign direct investment in resource extraction leads to conflict via
such a mechanism. This study uses a qualitative case study to argue that this mechanism
is at play in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region and then attempts to show that the same
relationship may also exist globally using large-N quantitative data.

Introduction
In the 1950s oil was discovered in Nigeria. Since then multi-national corporations
(MNCs) have descended on the Niger Delta regions, which contain most of the oil in the
country. The foreign investments in oil extraction have brought unprecedented wealth to
the country, although the resulting oil rents have exacerbated inequality across and within
its regions. While Nigeria has seen oil rents regularly compose over a tenth of its annual
GDP, Nigeria’s oil-rich regions have been economically and environmentally decimated
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with far-reaching consequences for the regions’ ethnic minority groups, notably the
Ogoni and Ijaw. In the last 30 years, the oil-rich regions have become completely
militarized by ethnic militias and government militaries fighting over oil production and
thousands of lives have been lost to violence. Sadly, Nigeria's history is not unique;
examples of resource-fueled subnational wars abound.
In fact, over the past 70 years civil wars have become the most common form of
war. It is then imperative that we better understand how and why wars between
subnational groups are fought. As expected, much time and thought has been devoted to
develop our understandings of the various causes of subnational wars. Many scholars
have focused on distinguishing types of subnational wars for further study (Sambanis,
2001), since different types of war in different contexts may have different causes. This
paper aims to examine one type of civil wars identified in the literature, ethnic or
identity-based wars, and how foreign direct investment (FDI) in resource extractionary
industries (REFDI) may play a role, as it seems to have in Nigeria.
Drawing on existing literature and empirical results that evidence social
identification and political exclusion of politically relevant ethnic groups as key
mechanisms and determinants for ethnic wars, respectively, I attempt to evidence shortterm relationships between increases in REFDI and ethnic war via mechanisms of social
identification. Given that ethnic demography, political representation of ethnic groups,
and levels of economic development vary tremendously across countries, and that
resource extractionary development has been associated with subnational conflict, this
study will aim to examine how ethno-political marginalization and REFDI can combine
to increase risk of ethnic conflict via mechanisms of social identification.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: I review the existing literature and
parse previously theorized causal mechanisms. Next I introduce a formal model of
identity formation created by Sambanis and Shayo (2013), and use the model to develop
intuition on the possible contextualized effects of REFDI on social identity and conflict. I
then illustrate how REFDI contributed to ethnic conflict in Nigeria using existing studies
and articles. After demonstrating these processes in Nigeria I analyze large-N economic
and political data to show that the same processes apparent in Nigeria may also exist
around the world. Do to a lack of satisfactory data on REFDI I use a rough proxy detailed
below. I conclude by assessing the results given the available quantitative data and point
to new avenues of inquiry.

Existing Literature
While many scholars have focused on economic determinants of civil war, the
literature on identity-based conflict has identified, in addition to economic determinants,
affective and political factors that lead people to fight (notably, Sambanis, 2001; Wood,
2003; Cederman et al. 2010). Additionally, scholars have long analyzed the so-called
“resource curse”, whereby states with high levels of valuable natural resources such as
petroleum or alluvial diamonds tend to see more violent conflict. Asal et al. (2013), show
that while oil alone may not dramatically increase the chances of ethnic conflict, when
ethnic groups are politically excluded from central executive state power and live in
geographically concentrated regions, the presence of oil in these regions increases the
chances of conflict.

5

As levels of globalized economic markets have proliferated in this time too, it is
important to understand the interactions between globalization on war, especially at a
subnational level. Many empirical studies as well as surveys of corporate officers of
multinational corporations (MNCs) show that firms choose to invest in countries where
political instability and thus investment risk is low (Pierpont, 2005; Global Investment
Competitiveness Report, World Bank Group, 2018). This leads to a negative correlation
between conflict and FDI. Less research, however, examines the reciprocal effects of FDI
on the risks for political instability, corruption, and subnational violence and the results
have been mixed and largely ignore ethnic conflict as a factor in violence (Gissinger and
Gleditsch, 1999; Barbieri and Reuveny, 2005; Robertson and Watson, 2004). Since
MNCs aim to invest in countries with lower risk, any empirical analysis of a causal
relationship between REFDI and conflict or vice versa must account for endogeneity
bias. This paper aims to use a qualitative case study of Nigeria to trace causal pathways
from REFDI to ethnic violence as a means of demonstrating one way in which REFDI
can affect violence.
For context, I present a few graphs that demonstrate the existing economic
conditions and levels of ethnic violence over the past few decades. As seen in the graph
of Economic Indicators from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI,
2010), FDI and Oil Rents as a percent of each country’s GDP (averaged across countries
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by year) have risen in recent years.

Notably, Mineral rents have not risen, which I address later. Additionally, I
present a graph of Ethnic Wars, representing the proportion of countries in a given year
experiencing either at least one new ethnic war onset or an ongoing war, using the same
data as Asal et al. (2016) from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program on ethnic wars. I
explain the precise definitions of such wars later. While fewer countries experience
ongoing ethnic wars since just after the Cold War and Soviet breakup, the proportion of
countries at war remains high and the proportion of countries experiencing new ethnic
war onsets remains relatively high.
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Clearly, in an increasingly globalized world we have not figured out how to end
subnational and ethnic violence. We have, however, made big steps in identifying and
evaluating possible causes in the literature.

Literature on ethnic conflict:
Early accounts of civil war focused on primordial, deep-seated antipathies
between groups to account for irrational violence. Around the turn of the
21st century, researchers began to identify economic mechanisms to explain sub-national
conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) (henceforth CH), explained participation in civil war
as a rational economic decision informed by available loot from the spoils of war.
Similarly, Fearon and Laitin (2003) (henceforth FL) proposed that individuals participate
in sub-national violence based on a rational decision weighing the costs of rebellion
(affected by state strength) against group-based grievances. In this account, opportunity
structures feature prominently in predicting rebellion. These seminal works pushed other
researchers to examine underlying nuances in these studies, particularly in defining
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independent and dependent variables, evaluating the legitimacy of different proxies for
such variables, and illuminating various causal pathways between independent and
dependent variables. For example, how do we measure the onset of a civil war? Do we
define civil wars differently if groups make ethnically defined claims, and fight as
ethnically defined groups? What if the civil war results from an elite coup? What if the
war takes place in a democratic country as opposed to an authoritarian regime? What if
international actors play a role?

The results of these inquiries have led to a few understandings. While CH and FL
downplayed the role of ethnicity in their studies, Sambanis (2001), Cederman et al.
(2010), Wegenast and Basedau (2014), and numerous other studies find that while ethnic
identification may not be a necessary condition for civil war, some degree of ethnic
identification and ethnic variance within a country can affect the chances of ethnic civil
wars. Sambanis (2001) argues that unlike non-ethnic wars in which economic opportunity
factors heavily, in ethnic wars, political grievances of ethnic groups predominantly cause
ethnic wars. Cederman et al. (2010), using disaggregated group-level data, further
evidence the importance of ethnicity, finding that ethnic groups that are excluded from
central executive state power, especially having experienced a recent downgrade in
power, tend to fight more. Cederman et al. (2010), however, also find that mobilizational
capacity and histories of violence do matter in predicting conflict. Numerous political
science, behavioral economic, and psychology studies have highlighted the importance of
individual identification with a group for collective action (Littman and Paluck, 2015;
Wood, 2003; Hale, 2004; Chandra, 2006; Charnysh et al., 2015; Reicher et al., 2008),
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although many of these ascribe different mechanisms for the importance of identity for
action. Such mechanisms include reducing information asymmetries, establishing norms,
common in-group identity models (CIIM), and more, and will be discussed in the
mechanisms section.

As noted in the introduction, researchers have also examined links between
resource wealth, FDI, and conflict. CH argue that an increase in resource wealth
incentivizes materially focused groups to loot. FL, however, argue that if a state is able to
strengthen itself from its resource wealth then it can better prevent conflict. Clearly, these
two arguments point in opposite causal directions. Both effects may likely exist to
differing degrees in different contexts. Tomashevskiy (2016) creates a formal economic
model that shows how foreign investors and authoritarian leaders can use investment
inflows to reduce incentives for political elites to launch coups. Meanwhile, Roy (2018)
argues that while easily lootable natural resources increase incentives to fight, politically
inclusive institutions can limit these conflict-inducing effects.
Focusing on the individual level, a new study by Steven Liao presented at the
“Immigration: Research Frontiers and Policy Challenges Conference” (October, 2019)
argues that increases in foreign investment in the US housing market by Chinese
international students decreases anti-immigration bias amongst locals due
to sociotropic economic interests. While this context differs dramatically from REFDI in
developing countries, it shows that some types of FDI may help decrease out-group bias.
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Importantly, some studies have focused on the effects of natural resources and/or
FDI interacting with ethnic identities. Notably, Asal et al. (2016) argue that “Ethnic
groups subject to exclusion whose settlement area includes oil wealth are more likely to
experience the onset of armed conflict than groups experiencing exclusion alone” based
on a large-N statistical analysis (1343). Wegenast and Basedau (2014) find evidence that
salience-based ethnic fractionalization is associated with higher conflict onset risk, and
“that oil further increases the conflict potential within fractionalized countries”
(431). Sorens (2011), however, argues that the presence of lootable resources should not
increase chances of ethnic-based coups because looting has negative externalities on the
rest of the group. Sorens finds that among geographically concentrated ethnic groups in
peripheral regions of states, increasing values of mineral resource wealth increase
chances of autonomist rebellions and decrease chances of rebellions that aim to control
central power, and that rebels do not loot from their own constituencies. Sorens, however,
uses a data set of secessionist movements from Walter (2006) that has since been
repudiated as imprecise and misleading (Sambanis et al., 2017).
Meanwhile, Aspinall (2007), in a qualitative examination of processes leading to
conflict in Indonesian regions argues that the combination of ethnically salient politics
and resource wealth in the Aceh region ultimately led to conflict. Aspinall argues that
a legacy of past conflict, state institutionalization of ethnicity, and elite agency in
constructing discourse allowed oil resources to be interpreted as ethnic grievances,
facilitating violence. The wealth of (often conflicting) research has generated multiple
theoretical mechanisms linking ethnicity, resources and foreign investment to conflict. In
the next section I articulate these mechanisms.
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Causal Mechanisms
Various causal mechanisms have been theorized to explain sub-national conflict. Here I
identify those associated with ethnic wars, i.e. those in which individual identity
matters. Under an instrumentalist conception of identity, individuals can easily choose
and switch their identities based on rational decisions. Under Primordialist conceptions,
individuals have deep-rooted fixed identities and natural antagonisms toward out-groups.
Under Constructivist theories of social identity, individuals may choose from an available
set of identities based on rational decision making, however identities are sticky, and
switching is psychologically costly and rare (Shayo, 2007). Some of the following
mechanisms can apply under each or some of these conceptualizations of identity.

Material Greed for Loot (Booty Futures):
This mechanism highlights the rational incentive individuals face to engage in violence to
control state resources and/or secede from a state to control a region’s resources
completely. CH highlights this method, although numerous studies such as Humphreys
(2005), and Aspinall (2007) argue that material greed cannot account for large-scale
rebellions, while other studies mentioned find that material greed is negligible in
ethnically defined wars.

Low (Material) Cost for Violence via Weak States
Here, rebel groups choose to rebel when the cost of violence is low due to weak state
capacity. FL champions this mechanism (among others), although they use GDP/capita as
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a proxy for state capacity, a potentially misleading estimator. While GDP/capita
correlates with decreased conflict in many studies, attributing this correlation to the
weak states mechanism may be spurious. Humphreys (2005) finds evidence that conflict
is more likely in weaker states (proxied by other estimators), although a social-identity
construction mechanism (below) can also account for this result.

Low (Material) Opportunity Cost for Violence
Here, individuals participate in violence because their opportunity costs are so low that
violence is rational. Here, economic development, education, employment, or other
economic factors are so dismal that individuals might as well participate. Economic
determinants (such as GDP/capita) have been correlated with decreasing conflict (as
mentioned above), although these correlations may not imply causal mechanisms.

Information Asymmetries in Wealth Distribution
Here, conflict results because rebel groups face information asymmetries in regard to
potential resource rents under state control. Since governments can obscure profits from
resource extraction rebels may not be able to accurately assess the material costs and
benefits of rebellion without actual control over extraction, thus making nonviolent
negotiation over rents impossible. The only way for groups to know if they are fairly
compensated for resources in their region may be to acquire control over those resources
through violence. Numerous studies site the possibility of this in exacerbating conflict,
but testing for a lack of knowledge proves methodologically challenging.
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Political and/or Material Grievances
Here, individuals rebel because they perceive political or material grievances for
themselves and their groups. I combine political and material grievances here because
unequal political power may determine unequal economic development. I.e. material
grievances may be the result of political exclusion, a political grievance. In other cases,
political power may result from economic power, in which case the causal sign is flipped.
It is of more use to consider whether some form of grievance per se causes individuals to
commit violence. Cederman et al. (2010) and Asal et al. (2016) provide evidence for this
mechanism by showing a correlation between political exclusion and conflict. This
mechanism is distinguished from “greed”, because the greed mechanism focuses on
future loot, while grievances focus on past inequalities. Kalin and Sambanis (2018),
however, argue that the desire for political or economic benefits can encompass both of
these mechanisms, and that the differences in these mechanisms, as well as the
opportunity cost mechanism, are negligible.

Social-identity Construction
Here, political and material circumstances (including histories of violence) influence how
an individual identifies, which in turn determines the rational level of violence to commit.
Here, individuals can choose from a fixed set of identities to maximize utility. This
mechanism is based on micro-evidence in social psychology, behavioral economics, and
political science (Sambanis and Shayo, 2013; Kalin and Sambanis, 2018; Wood, 2003).
Under this mechanism, weak state institutions may contribute to violence less because
they have lower capacity to quell violence, but because weaker states may not have
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infiltrative bureaucracies, social programs, and development programs that could boost
national status and national identification and thus decrease violence.

Exploring Social Identity Formation (SS13)
Nicholas Sambanis and Moses Shayo in "Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict"
(2013) (henceforth SS13) formalize a theory of ethnic identification and ethnic conflict
that endogenizes violence in a constructivist process of social identification. They draw
on micro-evidence in psychology, behavioral economics and political science to model
determinants of ethnic identification. Notably, their model introduces the possibility of
identity equilibria, in which identities and fighting efforts are balanced given different
contexts. Under this model, individuals have a set of identities from which they can
identify, some being sub-national communities, or ethnic groups, and one being a
national group (some weighted union of all sub-national groups). Individuals consider
their perceived levels of similarities with group members as well as groups' relative
statuses, and then choose an identity. Based on existing evidence, they assume that:

1. Individuals that perceive themselves to be more similar to a group, A, than to a
group, B, are more likely to identify with group A.
2. Individuals care about the status of groups (defined by material wealth and
exogenous socio-political, historical factors), and would rather both identify with a
group of higher status and that the group with which they identify increase in status.
3. Inter-ethnic fighting effort increases the salience of ethnic attributes in
determining perceived similarity to groups.
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Increased violence can push individuals to identify ethnically, and individuals choose
levels of violence based on their identities. Therefore, violence is endogenous to identity
and vice versa. In the next section I show how the SS13 model can develop intuition for
how REFDI may affect violence and identity equilibria.

REFDI Effects in Light of SS13:
Here I describe mathematically defined relationships between variables in SS13, and
relate them to how REFDI may affect those variables. Afterwards, I show how fighting
and identity equilibria in SS13 may change according to changes in the variables.

1. Individuals hold defining characteristics such as language, region of residence,
region of origin, religion, and skin pigmentation, although there are theoretically
limitless characteristics. Individuals are socialized in a given context to recognize a
set of typical shared characteristics as categorizing a group (be it a nation, ethnic
group, or other social group). Therefore, individuals will place different emphases on
different characteristics across social contexts. For example, an American’s country
of origin may matter less than the color of their skin in determining their racial group
as socially constructed by their society.
2. An individual will perceive himself to be closer to (or farther from) a group if his
characteristics align more (or less) closely with the median characteristics of the
group across members. In other words, the distance an individual perceives between
himself and a group increases as the median characteristics of the group become less
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similar to his own. Since ethnic groups may be subsections of more diverse national
groups, an individual may likely feel less distance to an ethnic group than to a nation.
Additionally, inter-group violence will increase the weight an individual places on
group characteristics. (I.e. violence increases the saliency of group characteristics in
determining distance.) Violence then makes it more costly to identify with a group
that one perceives as distant.
3. Individuals perceive a nation group, N, and social group, A to have status, which
increases with material wealth, especially relative to other groups. Exogenous sociopolitical and historical factors also influence perceived status. For example, when
Israel won the 1967 War in six days, many Israelis felt more proud of their national
identity because the symbolism of defeating historical enemies increased Israel’s
status.
a. Importantly, an increase in REFDI to N is an increase in N’s GDP and is
intended to spur economic development which may further increase N’s GDP.
This will increase the status of N. Under SS13, political dynamics in the state
are not modeled, and increases in material wealth to N benefit all subnational
groups equally. Extending SS13, if political exclusion of group A results in
less economic development for group A compared to other subnational
groups, then the status of A may decrease even though the overall status of N
increases.
4. In equilibrium, an individual will choose to identify with N instead of A if the
status of N minus the status of A outweighs his perceived distance to N minus his
perceived distance to A. The difference in status may outweigh the difference in
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distance because of the magnitudes of difference, or because the individual cares
more about status than perceived distance. In other words the relative saliences of
status and perceived distance can differ.
5. An individual will choose to identify with A if the above condition is flipped.
6. It is possible for an individual’s perceived distant from a national group to be so
great, or the saliency of distance to be so great, that it is almost impossible for him to
identify nationally. For example it is conceivable that a Palestinian citizen of Israel
would never identify nationally because that individual may feel too distant from the
socially constructed Israeli identity.

Under SS13, members of A fight over shares of N’s contestable resources, V,
with another sub-national group, B. Fighting, however, decreases available V (by using
resources), which subsequently decreases the status of N. Individuals choose to commit
fighting resources, F, based on their chosen identities. Individuals who identify with N
choose to commit very little resources to fighting because that would decrease the status
of their group. Thus, all else equal, the more fighting there is in a country, the less likely
an individual is to identify with N, and the more likely they are to continue fighting,
resulting in identity-fighting equilibria.
According to the model, if an individual under equilibrium identifies with N
instead of A or B, then F decreases as the salience of group status increases. If an
individual under equilibrium identifies with A, or B, then F will increase as the salience
of group status increases, because the more they fight the more of V they can control.
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Under both equilibria, F increases with V. If V is easily contestable then this
effect increases. In the context of natural resources, individuals fight over control of
resource rent distribution. REFDI provides quick cash injections through royalties and
production sharing agreements as well as later cash through income taxes, conceptualized
as increases in easily contestable V (Moran). REFDI revenues can be contested
differently in different political contexts, either through legitimate means such as
legislation over budget allocation, or through elite corruption at the national or local
levels. Below are different scenarios of how REFDI could affect various identity
equilibria:

1. Let nation, N, have moderate to low status but not a lot of violence, F, with
subnational groups A and B. Assume that the group statuses of A and B are very low.
This is essentially why there is little fighting, because individuals do not have a lot of
incentive to identify strongly with A or B instead of the nation, N. Thus there exists
the identity equilibrium such that individuals identify with N. Now introduce an
increase in REFDI. The increase in investment rents takes the form of a large
immediate increase in contestable resources, V, which also increases national status.
Even under national identification this increase in V can increase fighting. An
increase in fighting could increase the salience of group characteristics even more,
posing the potential to increase ethnic identification. This shift in identification
should be easy considering N’s moderate to low status.
2. Now let nation N have low status and a history of political exclusion of ethnic
group A, but little violence because there are few resources over which to fight (a
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reasonable assumption given N’s low status). This means that the salience of group
characteristics must be high, as political exclusion is defined by such characteristics.
An increase in REFDI in this country may drastically increase violence, since
individuals are already in an ethnic group identity equilibrium.
3. Now, assume moderate national status and allow heterogeneous identification
within groups, where some members of group A feel much closer to A than to N. The
rest of the country identifies with N. The “radical” A members cannot switch their
identity to the nation (in line with “sticky” constructivist models of
identity; Shayo, 2007), and must continue to identify ethnically and care primarily
about the status of group A regardless of exogenous shocks. Here, an increase in
REFDI increases V, and increases the optimal F of these “radical” A’s regardless of
whether the increase in REFDI was enough to substantially increase F among other
individuals. The increase in V among radicals, however, increases the cost of
identifying with the nation for the rest of individuals with group A characteristics,
leading to a new equilibrium where most members with group A characteristics
identify with A. Fighting increases.
4. In this scenario, as in scenario 3, assume moderate national status and
heterogeneous identification within groups. Allow for REFDI to increase V as before,
but disproportionately degrades the productive capacity of the land on which most of
group A lives. Some less “radical” individuals who choose to identify with N (but
could identify with A) move away to other parts of the country for better economic
opportunities, but the more radical A’s find it hard to move (maybe they only speak
group A’s language). Here the status of group A decreases as its productive capacity
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falls vis-à-vis other groups, and radical A’s increase F to capture more V. As in
scenario 3, this alters identity equilibria for potential A members and ethnic
identification and fighting increase.
Below is a table summarizing the various possible scenarios, where I represents
identification, S represents status; V, contestable resources; F, allocated fighting
resources; and subscripts A, B and N represent groups A, B, and the Nation, respectively.
Scenario

Initial
Conditions

1.

IN,
Low SN

2.
3.

4.

Exogenous
shock from
REFDI
Increase V

Initial Change

Secondary
Change

New
Equilibrium

Increase FA,B

Increase IA,B
Decrease IN

IA,B,
Low SN
IN,A(radicals)
Moderate SN

Increase V

Increase FA,B

Increase V

Increase
FA(radicals)

Decrease IN,
Increase IA

IN,A
Moderate SN

Increase V,
Decrease SA

Increase IN,
Decrease IA,
Increase
FA(radicals)

Increase IA

Increased
fighting and
ethnic
Identification
Increased
fighting
Increased
fighting and
ethnic
Identification
Increased
fighting and
ethnic
Identification

Thus, the material effects of REFDI pose the potential for increases in ethnic
identification and increased violence in multiple contexts.

Abstracting from the narrow results of SS13, it is important to consider how
REFDI allows actors to manipulate resource rents to change group status and levels of
contestable resources. Let's say that a country in which most people identify ethnically
receives an increase in REFDI from an MNC. The country could choose to distribute
21

rents to group A, increasing the status of group A vis-a-vis other groups. This may enrage
members of other groups who value their own group status and encourage violence to
capture control over rents.
Alternatively, let’s say the state wants to avoid violence. The state could equally
distribute rents among its various sub-national ethnic groups to spur economic
development, raising the overall status of the nation as a whole without changing the
relative statuses of subnational groups. This is most similar to how countrywide increases
in V affect status in SS13. This would incentivize national identification and less
violence. This could work, however if ethnic identification is high a priori, then different
groups might still fight over the proportions of rents distributed to each group.
In a democracy, equal distribution could undermine an elected official's
constituent support because said official could be seen to be giving resources to an outgroup, reneging on perceived patronage norms existent in many democracies. In weak
states, corruption could mean that there is not even the opportunity for rents to make their
way down to real development projects at all.
Tomashevskiy (2016) shows that authoritarian leaders must pay off political elites
in order to retain control after FDI. In a state where elite membership is ethnically
defined, giving money to an excluded group diverts available rents from co-ethnic elites,
increasing chances of a coup. Thus, there may exist incentives for an authoritarian leader
to not distribute rents equally to different ethnic groups, or even at all. Given numerous
information asymmetries between the state and excluded groups surrounding REFDI
profits as well as information asymmetries surrounding fighting potential, out-group
members could respond with increased F even if elites do aim to distribute rents equally.
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If REFDI and group A are geographically concentrated in the same region, that
alone could increase the perceived distance between A and the nation, incentivizing F.
Additionally, if the REFDI (such as oil extraction) would cause environmental
degradation or other decreases in group A status, then members of group A might oppose
the REFDI altogether, or would demand even more resource rents as compensation.

As a result of this reasoning I propose two main hypotheses:

H1: In states with politically excluded ethnic groups, increases in REFDI increase ethnic
identification.
H2: In states with politically excluded ethnic groups, increases in REFDI increase ethnic
violence.

Next I explain how these hypotheses seem to manifest in a quintessential example
of identity-based violence over resource control, that of Nigeria's Niger Delta Region,
and how REFDI affects social identity and fighting equilibria.

Effects of REFDI in Nigeria’s Niger Delta
Historical Background
In understanding the effects of REFDI on ethnic conflict, it is helpful to look at
the history of Nigeria. Due to British colonial legacies, Nigeria was created as a federalist
state, with three major regions, Northern, Western and Eastern, populated respectively by
the country’s three largest ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, although
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by Nigeria’s independence, considerable population movement had occurred across
regions and hundreds of diverse groups and languages live in Nigeria. Oil in Nigeria is
largely concentrated in the Niger Delta regions in South-Eastern Nigeria, made up of
Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta states, an area of about 27,000 square miles (Hallmark, 2017).
Oil has been extracted mostly by joint ventures between MNCs and national companies
since 1956. Since the 1960s, the existence of oil and the potential rents associated have
raised the stakes over who controls the land and how resource rents are distributed
throughout the country (Ukiwo, 2007). Under SS13 this could be understood as an
increase in contestable V.
Nigeria follows a “Derivation Principle” in distributing resource rents, whereby
producing states get a percent of the rents from their own resources (Nwajiaku, 2005).
Following the Biafran Civil War between (primarily) Igbo in the Eastern region and the
Federal Government in the 1960s the state was severely weakened and new Local
Government Areas (LGAs) for local administration were created. After the war the
Derivation Principle was also weakened and the central government began to distribute
less and less regional resource rents to the Niger Delta states. In the 1980s, government
Structural Adjustment Programs also began to decrease public development efforts and
employment.
Simultaneously, while Shell-BP, Mobil, and other MNCs were profiting off of the
oil from the region local tribal groups began to criticize the FDI, noting severe
environmental and agricultural degradation and the lack of development initiatives for the
region’s populations. Countless oil spills in the mangrove-populated region have ruined
the productive capacity of the land for farming and fishing for decades if not centuries to
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come. Criticisms grew into political dissent, and eventually non-violent and then violent
actions to rest control of the region’s resources from the central government and MNCs
(Hallmark, 2017). Notably, many of these movements have been ethnically defined. The
first large scale movement was MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People), which, founded by famed activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1990, agitated for local
control over oil resources by the Ogoni, an ethnic group indigenous to a small area of the
Niger Delta with extreme oil extraction and environmental degradation. MOSOP engaged
almost entirely in non-violent action however the Nigerian government
violently repressed the movement with discriminate and indiscriminate violence
including wide-scale murder and rape of entire communities and the execution of
movement leaders including Saro-Wiwa himself (Mai-Bornu, 2019; Hallmark, 2017).
The Ogoni movement (along with continued environmental degradation that left
local communities unable to fish and farm) inspired the creation of MEND (Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta), a predominantly Ijaw group. Ijaw are also
primarily located in the Niger Delta region, although concentrated in slightly different
sub-regions. MEND, which united a loose confederacy of Ijaw militant groups, tried to
force concessions by the Nigerian government and MNCs to give Ijaw control over oil on
their land. MEND violently disrupted oil extraction, seized oil, and even held foreign
MNC workers hostage for ransom. MEND was very successful in hindering Nigerian oil
extraction, at one point decreasing Nigerian oil production by 500,000 barrels a day
(Ukiwo, 2007). After successive repression and appeasement tactics by the Nigerian
Government MEND broke up and died out. The Nigerian government co-opted some
Ijaw leaders and militants by offering amnesty, buying weapons from them, or offering
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security contracts to guard the oil they once plundered (Pegg, 2015). Following MEND,
the NDA (Niger Delta Avengers), another Ijaw group, took up the mantel and through
well-armed and well-planned attacks has at times managed to cripple Nigeria’s oil output.
Following NDA attacks, oil output in Nigeria fell by 800,000 per day in 2016 to 1.4
million, its lowest output in 25 years (Hallmark, 2017). The NDA agreed to a cease-fire
with the Nigerian Government to promote peace talks, but announced an end to the
cease-fire in November 2017, citing insincerity on the part of the national government.
Additionally, Nigerian GDP/capita remains far below global averages, illustrated
in the graph below using the same World Develop Indicator data:

Examined from afar, a pattern emerges of local minorities excluded from central
government control rising up in rebellion against MNC oil extraction. Meanwhile, the
Nigerian Government violently represses action and buys off leaders until rebellion
subsides. Afterwards, new militants emerge to continue fighting against perceived
grievances in the names of their ethnic groups and the cycle continues. On closer look, it
becomes clear how social identity formation has helped mobilize fighting.
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Social Identity Pathways
Similarities to Scenario Two
Certain structural elements of Nigerian politics, including its patronage and
federalist legacies, draw certain similarities to Scenario Two in the section titled “REFDI
Effects in Light of SS13”. Due to its federalist legacy the central government allocates
resource rents to administrative states, which, in theory, use the money for economic
development. In line with SS13, this provides contestable resource rents available for
“capture” by various groups through political means. Ethnically defined groups can force
the government to give their states more rents if they have more mobilizational capacity.
They can do this through legal political institutions, such as electing politicians to the
national government, or by less legal means such as corruption or violence. Due to
its patronage legacy, representation in sub-national administrative units can determine
how resources are allocated.
As Nwajiaku (2017) explains, “In a political system in which patron-client
relationships prevail as the principle channel through which "citizens" gain access to the
state and its resources, ethnicity matters. By increasing the distributive scope of the state,
oil has served to entrench ethnicity as a set of effective codes through which to secure
access to net-works of patronage.” If ethnic groups lack the political power to acquire
resource rents then they choose to fight. Applying SS13, REFDI has increased
contestable resources held by the state, and Nigerian citizens in the relevant regions tend
to identify ethnically, while Nigerian national status remains relatively low.
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Additionally, at various points in Nigeria’s history sub-national administrative
units, states, and their sub-units, LGAs, have been created or destroyed, changing which
groups comprise majorities in these units. This can be understood as a non-violent way
that ethnic groups compete through established political institutions for resource control,
which at times has escalated into violence, as described in the historical overview. In
short, after initial low national status and ethnic identification, an exogenous increase in
contestable resources led to an equilibrium with entrenched high ethnic identification and
high fighting efforts by ethnic groups for access to resource rents. This evidences H2.

Similarities to Scenario Four
The struggle over resource control in the Niger Delta also bears similarity to
scenario four, where increased resources and decreased ethnic status lead to increased
fighting among highly identifying ethnic group members and thus more ethnic
identification.
Part of the struggle over resource wealth has been by the Ijaw ethnic group,
arguably the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria (Nwajiaku, 2005). Since the 1970s,
Ijaw political leaders have tried to keep Ijaw administratively concentrated to achieve
greater political control over oil (Ukiwo, 2007). Notably, one reason that Ijaw are
arguably the fourth largest ethnic group is because the conception of Ijaw identity has
changed over the last few decades in response to changing contexts. In the 1990s, various
Ijaw elites were weakened or deposed from office, and many Ijaw interpreted this as the
central government and other larger ethnic groups seizing power over the oil industry
(Ukiwo, 2007). Azam (2009) notes that after resource extraction decimated local
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economic conditions, many Ijaw migrated out of the Niger Delta region to areas where
they could farm arable land. However, they were met with hostile responses from other
groups, who saw them as outsiders. Attempted Ijaw emigration from Ijaw lands then
stopped since their identity precluded them from assimilating into other groups. Here,
under SS13, group characteristics are salient enough that many Ijaw can only identify
with their sub-group, and thus must fight to rest control of resources. In response The
Ijaw National Congress (INC) and the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), both created in the
1990s organized and promoted an Ijaw ethnic nationalism. Here, the organizers of the
INC and IYC can be viewed as highly-identifying Ijaw for whom it is hard to switch
identities and their organization efforts can be conceptualized as extremely low level
increases to fighting resources (as their efforts are largely peaceful). Increased Ijaw
ethnic nationalism resulted in various Ijaw youths from different areas supporting each
other in operations against the state and MNCs and even supporting Ijaw groups outside
of the Niger Delta (increased ethnic Ijaw identification) (Ukiwo, 2007). Central to Ijaw
claims were grievances that they attributed to MNCs and an uncaring Nigerian state. In
its 1998 founding document, the Kaiama Declaration, the IYC conceptualizes their
grievances as such: “That the quality of life of Ijaw people is deteriorating as a result of
utter neglect, suppression and marginalization visited on Ijaws by the alliance of the
Nigerian state and transnational oil companies… That the degradation of the environment
of Ijawland by transnational oil companies and the Nigerian State arise mainly because
Ijaw people have been robbed of their natural rights to ownership and control of their
land and resources…” (Kaiama Declaration, 1998).
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In April, 2019, the IYC declared that they must control local resources even if it
means being killed, modeled as a sharp increase in fighting resources. They argue that in
other Nigerian regions local people have been controlling resources and reaping the
rewards so people of the Niger Delta should be able to do the same (Sahara Reporters,
2019). This explicit “us” versus “them” argument implies a salient sub-national identity.
Indeed, the IYC’s President, Pereotubo Oweilaemi, stated “There cannot be one Nigeria
if everybody in the country is not treated with the same measure” (Sahara Reporters,
2019). In this lens, REFDI in the Niger Delta clearly affects violence and social identity.

MNC Involvement in Identity Formation
While some aspects of this violence appear very similar to SS13 scenarios, MNC
involvement (the source of REFDI), has also affected social identity formation.
Importantly, the Ogoni conceptualized the Nigerian government and MNCs as the same
entity, bent on extracting resources at any cost. As Pegg et al. (2015) explains, quoting
Omeje, “…“In the minds and reckoning of a large section of the local people, there is
hardly any distinction between the oil industry and the state. The two are perceived as
one and the same entity” (Omeje, 2005:328). Most self-determination movements direct
their claims solely at sovereign governments. In the Ogoni case, such claims were always
directed both at the state and at the oil companies”. Since MNCs and the state are so
intertwined, identification with the nation necessitates identification with MNCs.
Another connection between MNCs’ REFDI and ethnic conflict lies in the
federalist system and the weakness of the Nigerian state. After Nigeria’s civil war, Shell
and other MNCs began to negotiate terms of investment with local communities. What
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this meant was that the smaller the community that the MNCs negotiated with the more
narrow the MNC would have to apply development initiatives, which were commonly
promised as part of contracts. Additionally, the smaller the community, the less resource
rents would have to be spread across people, increasing the share per person. What this
meant was that “host communities”, which were very small and defined by their close
proximity to oil drilling tried to claim more bargaining rights with MNCs to obtain more
resource rents (Nwajiaku, 2005). “Oil producing communities”, which were larger and
included the host communities, had to legitimate their claims to rents. The INC and IYC
did this by promoting a “pan-Ijaw ethnic nationalism”. Under this conceptualization, they
were all Ijaw and oil on “Ijaw lands” should benefit all Ijaw (Nwajiaku, 2005). But the
Ijaw ethnic group is not a monolith; over 40 different clans attended the Kaiama
Declaration, and many Ijaw subgroups speak languages that are more similar to the
languages of other major ethnic groups in Nigeria (Nwajiaku, 2005). What this means is
that because the MNCs wanted to negotiate with as small a group as possible the panIjaw groups had to forge strong clan identities and then conceptualize them within a
super-ordinate Ijaw identity (Nwajiaku, 2005). “So although oil, they (Ijaw Nationalists)
argue, has not created the Ijaw nation, the struggle for ownership and more effective
control of the revenues accru-ing from oil, has served to galvanise disparate members of
the Ijaw ethnic community around a common plight” (Nwajiaku, 2005). The presence of
MNCs seeking oil revenues created the need for a strong Ijaw identity for many. This
can be viewed through the prism of SS13:
Let pan-Ijaw identification define a group identity called A, with heterogeneous
identification within A. Some individuals from “host communities” choose to identify
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differently because of the greater status they enjoy. Let host community identification be
called H. Prior to REFDI, according to Nwajiaku (2005), there was weak conception of
pan-Ijaw identity, and thus most people did not identify at all with A. The injection of
REFDI (or contestable resource, V) incentivized individuals not included in H to
construct A and claim more of V. The success of the IYC and INC in galvanizing a panIjaw identity can be interpreted as an increase in ethnic group identification. This increase
due to increased REFDI evidences hypothesis 1.
It is possible that without MNCs offering REFDI, this may still have happened if
the oil producing communities needed to substantiate claims to resource wealth in order
for local governments to allocate development projects to their areas and not just to the
more localized host communities. In the case of Nigeria this is a moot point since MNCs
were necessary to bring in the required capital to begin resource extraction. Considering
all possible countries with REFDI more broadly, this type of ethnic identity
homogenization could possibly take place without the presence of REFDI. That being
said, without MNC involvement more local labor would be necessary for resource
extraction. This would directly increase wealth and status to the region, mitigating
environmental-based consequences to the economy, and decreasing the need to
homogenize ethnic identity to gain resource wealth. Without REFDI, oil extraction is a
local development project. Additionally, as described below, the Ogoni pushed for local
control over resources because they argued that unlike local communities, MNCs lack
economic incentives to prevent environmental degradation. This is a clear difference
between the effects of MNCs’ REFDI and locally funded oil extraction. While this is not
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empirical evidence that REFDI necessitated changes in social identity formation, it offers
a theoretical explanation for why it might.
It is also instructive to examine the shift from non-violent to violent actions to
gain resource control (which constitutes an increase in fighting resources, F). Ken SaroWiwa, leader of the Ogoni MOSOP, studied the movements of Gandhi and Martin Luther
King Jr. Along with other highly educated Ogoni elites, he wrote the Ogoni Bill of
Rights, and mobilized other Ogoni using existing religious institutions and rhetoric to
frame and conceptualize Ogoni grievances as community based. They then demanded
autonomy over resources on their land via non-violent demonstrations and civil
disobedience. Notably, they pushed for control over resource rents, rather than an
increase in the derivation principle, because they did not trust the state to maintain such
changes later, in line with arguments by Sambanis and Milanovic (2014). Additionally,
they argued that without local control, MNCs would lack the economic incentives to
prevent catastrophic environmental degradation. Claims for increased autonomy over
resources were denied, and Saro-Wiwa began an international public relations campaign
to portray Ogoni suffering as an environmental and human rights abuse at the hands of
the state and MNCs (Mai-Bornu, 2019). The intersection of environmental and human
rights causes was a groundbreaking theoretical conceptualization at the time. “Saro-Wiwa
did this by playing the “Shell card” (Bob, 2005:81) and establishing the transnational oil
company as the vital nexus which was both directly involved in the environmental
devastation of Ogoni (United Nations Environment Programme, 2011) and indirectly
involved in the repression and human rights violations directed against the Ogoni through
its support of the Nigerian military dictatorship and its request for specific forms of
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security assistance from that dictatorship” Mai-Bornu (2019) argues that the high
educational levels of Saro-Wiwa and his confederates allowed them to conceptualize
their struggle with terms that resonated with an international audience, allowing and
necessitating non-violent resistance. Around this time, small Ijaw groups were
mobilizing, especially the youth, and beginning to create non-violent activist groups
claiming similar autonomy on the behalf of Ijaw people. However, after the Nigerian
state violently repressed MOSOP and slaughtered thousands of Ogoni, Ijaw groups
became more militant, eventually uniting under MEND. Mai-Bornu (2019) argues that
the Ijaw leaders at the time were less educated and had less recourse to non-violent
means of resistance, necessitating violence as an only option. I argue that non-violent
Ijaw activism in the early 1990s, as well as non-violent organization in the IYC precludes
this argument. I argue, as Mai-Bornu (2019) also concedes, that the violent repression of
the Ogoni movement convinced Ijaw leaders that an increase in fighting resources, F
(from non-violent to violent) was necessary to rest control of resource distribution. Under
SS13, I also argue that state violence increased the saliency of characteristics of ethnic
groups in the region, making it more costly for Ijaw to identify as anything but Ijaw,
further increasing equilibrium fighting. “The end result of this is that “Ijaw youths have
come to realize that the only language government and oil companies understand is
violence” (Ukiwo, 2007:609). Ikelegbe (2001) similarly notes that “violent
confrontations have actually been last resorts of the civil groups, embarked upon because
of the failure of peaceful methods” (459), while the International Crisis Group observes
that militants “have learned the unfortunate lesson that violence, extortion and
kidnapping are a way—sometimes the only way—to be taken seriously” (International
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Crisis Group, 2006:1). Under ethnic identification SS13 predicts increased violence given
increased contestable resources. The increasing violence taken by ethnic groups in the
region then makes sense given the unavailability of national identification and increasing
REFDI.

Other Evidence of Identity Formation
Oyefusi (2008) conducted a survey of male youths in the Delta and Rivers state to
try and understand why they fight. The survey did not ask respondents why they fought,
but rather asked respondents about their perceived and actual material and social
conditions and if they fought or not. After regressing responses on fighting, Oyefusi
(2008) finds material conditions can predict willingness to rebel, but that the high
significance of self-reported Ijaw identity “tends to lend empirical support to the close,
sometimes inseparable, connection between grievance and greed in motivating rebellion.”
Again, material status and willingness to commit fighting resources are dependent (and
influence) identity. Here, identity may serve as a medium through which to interpret
grievances.
Finally, in establishing the connection between REFDI and conflict Terminski
(2012) contends that some environmental degradation caused by development is not so
bad (like making damns) because local communities eventually benefit (from access to
productive resources, like water). Oil, by contrast, does not give these benefits. In Nigeria
during oil field exploration the oil companies laid waste to the land because they had no
incentive to protect its future productive capacity. Entirely state-sponsored development
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would have had more incentive to protect the environment, but Nigeria lacks the capacity
to sponsor such projects without REFDI from MNCs.
In Nigeria’s Niger Delta region REFDI has increased conflict in part because of
its effects on social identity formation. The qualitative analysis of historical contexts and
documents evidences both hypotheses. In the next sections I examine the connections
between REFDI, identity, and conflict with large-N statistical.

Quantitative Research Design
In line with most quantitative research on ethnic conflict I use OLS and logistic
regressions to explore any relationships between ethnic conflict and explanatory
variables. I want to know the effects of REFDI on the chances of ethnic conflict, so I
consider both the onset of new ethnic conflicts and the existence of ongoing ethnic
conflicts as dependent variables in different analyses. In analyzing new onsets, I can see
if REFDI increases the chances of conflict beginning when there was none previously. In
looking at ongoing conflicts, I can see if REFDI may increase the probability of conflict
continuing. Later I discuss potential insight from different results between onset and
ongoing conflict. I also consider the effects of known determinants of ethnic conflict
identified in the literature such as GDP/capita, political exclusion, population, and group
size. When regressing new or ongoing ethnic wars on lagged REFDI (and other control
variables), a positive and significant coefficient on lagged REFDI would evidence a
correlation between REFDI and ethnic conflict and support hypothesis 2. While I argue
that increasing REFDI will increase ethnic conflict because of its effects on social
identity formation, this causal mechanism is hard to measure empirically. In a less-than-
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perfect solution, I analyze ethnic versus national identification in African countries
compared with REFDI. A positive and significant correlation between lagged REFDI and
ethnic identification would suggest that increasing REFDI might increase ethnic
identification, supporting hypothesis 1. If both hypotheses are supported by the data then
there is evidence that social identity formation may be in part responsible for some ethnic
conflicts. I do not attempt to disprove other mechanisms nor claim that social identity
formation necessarily causes all ethnic conflicts with REFDI. I use this data to show that
the causal mechanisms I identify in Nigeria may also exist globally.

Data
Economic Data
I obtain economic data from The World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”
(WDI, 2010). Unfortunately I could not obtain direct data on REFDI. FDI inflows are
measured as investments from other countries and can be grouped by sectors such as
services, manufacturing, and mining. While The World Bank offers data on FDI inflows
by country-year and FDI inflows by sector-year, it does not offer data on FDI inflows by
country-sector-year. One other source sells data on FDI inflows by country-sector-year
but only for a small number of years, most of which did not match the range of years of
my other data. As a proxy for my main explanatory variable I use data on FDI inflows by
country-year (as a % of annual GDP) and data on each country’s Oil and Mineral Rents
by year (as a % of annual GDP). I create an interaction term multiplying FDI and
resource rents as a rough estimate for REFDI. Oil (mineral) rents are measured as the
difference between the value of produced oil (minerals) at global prices and the costs of
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production. I argue that this is a viable proxy because countries that rely heavily on
resource rents can be expected to receive a large proportion of FDI inflows in those
sectors. I also analyze whether groups were concentrated on land with oil production to
try and mitigate estimation error. Of course this is not ideal data and any results from this
analysis must be treated cautiously. I argue that any statistically significant relationship
between the interaction of FDI and resource rents and ethnic conflict provides evidence
that REFDI might lead to conflict, but definitely provides evidence that further research
with better data should be pursued. All economic data ranges from 1970 through 2018
when available. To give a sense of the increasing levels of REFDI (proxied), below is a
graph of yearly averages across each country’s FDI (as a % of GDP) times its Oil Rents
(as a % of GDP).

Conflict, Oil, and Group Data
To measure conflict, group characteristics, and oil presence I use data from Asal
et al. (2016). They use a pairing of data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program on ethnic
wars, Ethnic Power Relations data on geo-referenced ethnically relevant political groups
(Cederman et al. 2010), and geo-referenced data on petroleum production from Lujala,
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Rod, and Thieme (2007). This data is measured by country-group-year and contains
information on whether an ethnic group began a new conflict, was already engaged in
conflict from a previous year, was concentrated on land from which petroleum was
produced, was excluded from state central power, recently experienced downgraded
control of state central power, and demographic statistics. Asal et al. (2016) find that
groups excluded from central power are more likely to engage in violence and that the
existence of oil further increases those chances. By using this same data I can draw
connections between economic factors, political exclusion, oil, and conflict.
My data set aggregates Asal’s (2016) data with the WDI data by country-year.
Using Asal’s (2016) data I code for the total onset of ethnic wars within a country-year,
the total ongoing ethnic wars within a country-year, the percent of a country’s population
that is excluded from central power along ethnic group cleavages within a country-year,
war history by country-year, as well as log GDP. I include the WDI indicators mentioned
above by country-year as well as their single-year lagged equivalents. My data contains
observations for years from 1970 through 2005, although many observations are missing
data, oftentimes because countries have not existed for that whole period. The dependent
variables in my analysis are the total onsets of ethnic wars within a country-year and the
total ongoing ethnic wars within a country-year. I also code binary versions of the
dependent variables, taking the value 1 if at least one new ethnic war began (or if at least
one ethnic war was ongoing) in a country year, and 0 otherwise. By analyzing both
cardinal and binary outcomes I can use both OLS and Logistic regressions in an attempt
to increase robustness.
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Identity Data
To measure ethnic and national identity I intended to use Afrobarometer survey
results. Afrobarometer administers rounds of surveys to diverse and representative
populations in every African country deemed safe and open enough for reliable data
collection. Among other questions, participants are asked if they had to pick whether
would they identify ethnically or nationally. If ethnic identification increased in areas
with REFDI, then that would support Hypothesis 1. Unfortunately, Afrobarometer only
releases country level data for these questions to the public. Local geo-referenced
responses are only available for one country at a time or one round at a time with special
permission from the organization after an application. Admittedly, country-level data is
not an ideal proxy for measuring changes in ethnic identification caused by REFDI.
REFDI in one region may cause people from that region to identify ethnically, as we saw
is the case in Nigeria, however that same REFDI may increase the status of the nation
and incentivize other people elsewhere to identify more nationally. So the same increase
in REFDI could have opposite effects on identification for different people that would not
be captured by country-level averages. At the time of writing I did not have access to
geo-referenced data from Afrobarometer, but the day before submission I was granted
access to multiple rounds of geo-referenced data from Nigeria. Therefore I leave analysis
of identity data to support Hypothesis 1 for an appendix that I will write in the coming
days. The rest of this analysis deals with the relationships between economic data and
conflict, H2.

Analysis – Country-Year Data
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I begin examining simple correlations between economic factors and war, using
only complete observations. The results are below:
X

Y

Correlation

Total Ethnic War Onsets

FDI Inflows (% of GDP)

-0.005177101

Total Ethnic War Onsets

Oil Rents (% of GDP)

0.0291064

Total Ethnic War Onsets

Mineral Rents (% of GDP)

-0.01510931

Total Ongoing EthnicWars

FDI Inflows (% of GDP)

-0.02115598

Total Ongoing EthnicWars

Oil Rents (% of GDP)

0.01098177

Total Ongoing EthnicWars

Mineral Rents (% of GDP)

-0.05100424

Essentially, there is very little correlation between ethnic war and FDI inflows, oil
rents, and mineral rents. The negative signs on both FDI inflow correlations are
consistent with literature that correlates increases in FDI with stability. The positive signs
on both Oil correlations are consistent with theories of the “oil curse.” For the rest of this
section I omit analysis of Mineral Rents because there were no statistically significant
effects of Mineral Rents. Later I discuss why this may be the case.

First I regress new ethnic wars and ongoing ethnic wars on the independent
variables. The variables used and the outcomes are reported below. All use
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.

Model 1: (OLS)
Total new ethnic wars (or ongoing) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents
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There is no significant relationship between the explanatory variable and the
outcome for either new onsets or ongoing. Clearly REFDI cannot explain ethnic conflict
alone.

Model 2: (Logistic)
New ethnic war (or ongoing) (binary) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil
Rents
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Here I regress on the existence of at least one new ethnic war onset (or one
ongoing) using a logistic regression. Again, these results show that REFDI alone cannot
explain ethnic conflict. Results from using lagged WDI variables are similar and not
reported here. Next, I include all of the country level variables used in Asal et al. (2016):

Model 3: (OLS)
Total new ethnic wars (or ongoing) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents
+ percent of population excluded + log GDP/capita (lagged) + history of war
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When regressing on total ongoing wars the interaction between FDI inflows and
Oil rents becomes statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, although the
magnitude of the coefficient is tiny. Although log population size (lagged) was not
significant in Asal et al.’s analysis I include it here because it is significant. Next I run
logistic regressions on the binary versions of the dependent variables using the same
explanatory variables.

Model 4: (Logistic)
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Onset (or ongoing) (binary) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents +
percent of population excluded + log GDP/capita (lagged) + history of war + log
population (lagged)

Again, the interaction term is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, but
only for ongoing conflicts and not onsets.

Model 5: Country Fixed Effects
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Finally I run the same OLS regression as in Model 3, but with country Fixed
Effects to partially account for endogeneity concerns (discussed later).
Total new ethnic wars (or ongoing) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents
+ percent of population excluded + log GDP/capita (lagged) + history of war + Country
Fixed Effects

I do not report the individual coefficient estimates for every country, but do report
the coefficient estimates for the other explanatory variables.
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The coefficient on the interaction term for REFDI remains statistically significant at the
95% confidence level.

Analysis of Interaction Terms
Since I am using the multiplicative interaction term of FDI inflows and Oil rents
to proxy REFDI levels, I cannot interpret the interaction term’s coefficient as an
unconditional marginal effect of REFDI on the chances of conflict. Rather, as both FDI
inflows and Oil increase, the chances of ethnic conflict increase. In line with
recommendations by Hainmueller et al. (2019) and Brambor et al. (2006) on analyzing
interaction terms, I report plots of the interaction terms from the raw data and kernel
density estimations of the pdf of the outcomes for differing levels of the interaction
terms.

Below is a plot of the interaction terms and outcome variable total number of
ongoing wars created using “interflex” code from Hainmueller et al. (2019). “Treatment”
on the x-axis reports Oil rents (% GDP), plotted against the number of ongoing wars.
Each of the three graphs reports these relationships for low, medium, and high levels of
FDI respectively. The blue line is a linear regression, while the red is a LOESS fit.
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While the effects look very small, it is clear that the effects of oil rents change
depending on levels of FDI inflows. Only at high levels of FDI do increases in oil rents
increase the chances of conflict. This is expected given that I am attempting to proxy
REFDI with the interaction term. I am assuming that high levels of REFDI (in the oil
sector) correlate with high levels of FDI and oil rents, so low levels of either oil rents or
FDI imply low levels of REFDI. For low levels of FDI, I don’t necessarily care about the
effect of the interaction treatment.

Next I report a graph of the kernel estimates and the bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals for the marginal effects of oil rents in predicting the number of ongoing wars for
varying levels of FDI (controlling for GDP/capita and exclusion):
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Here we see that for levels of FDI inflows ranging from just above 0% to about 30% of
GDP, increasing Oil rents increase the probability of an ongoing war. While this appears
to contradict the raw plot above, it should be noted that the third raw plot graph with the
largest levels of FDI, the only graph that showed a positive relationship between the
treatment and outcome variables, begins at FDI levels of roughly 2% of GDP. This is
about the same level of FDI where marginal oil rent increases begin to show a positive
effect on the outcome variable.
It should be noted, however, that the marginal effects as well as any statistically
significant coefficient estimates in the regressions are very small, less than 0.05. While
most quantitative analyses of ethnic conflict report small effects this is still relatively
small. Below is the same graph with outcome equal to the number of new ethnic
conflicts. While the kernel estimate becomes more linear, the confidence intervals
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become so large that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no multiplicative
interaction effect for most levels of FDI inflows.

Mineral Rents?
As noted, any effects of FDI and oil rents were not seen for FDI and mineral
rents. The question then, is why? I argue that there may be structural differences between
the oil industry and the mining industry. For one, Oil investments can only benefit local
communities with the rents and compensation that they produce. As is the case in
Nigeria, if that compensation never happens then the communities never benefit. As is
also the case in Nigeria, bargaining over compensation forces judgments on who deserves
compensation, which can be decided based on identity. Unlike oil, mineral investment
poses the opportunity to create job growth. Oil production requires high skilled workers
and many MNCs bring in foreign workers. Mining, however, does not require the same
share of high skilled workers and so economic benefits may be shared more equitably
among indigenous populations. Additionally, mining does not render neighboring land
unproductive in the same way that oil drilling does after spills. If there are less grievances
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and less bargaining over compensation under mining investments then there may be less
reason to identify ethnically after mining foreign investments.
Aside from structural differences between oil and mining, the lack of explicit data
on mining FDI inflows may also limit results. Empirically, mining rents account for far
less than oil rents as a percent of GDP. On average, oil rents as a percent of GDP by
country-year are 4.89 times higher than that of mineral rents in the dataset. Average
yearly oil rents (% GDP) are 4.91 times higher than that of mineral rents. Given the low
levels of mineral rents, mineral rents (% of GDP) times FDI inflows may be a poor proxy
for Mining FDI. The graph below illustrates the low levels of mining rents in the data set
compared to FDI and oil rents:

As such, more research about the differences between the effects of mining and
oil on host communities and more precise data on FDI inflows by country-industry is
required to make any substantive claims.

Analysis – Country-Group-Year Data
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The results from analyzing Country-Year data were not impressive, although
hinted at possible relationships between REFDI and conflict. In order to assess the results
better, I also import the country-year WDI data into Asal et al.’s (2016) country-groupyear data. Now I can see how country-level FDI inflows and oil rents affect the chances
of rebellion when there exists oil production within a given group’s region. I can now
also incorporate group-level variables. Groups that recently experienced a downgrade in
political power are coded as well as (log) group size. Positive coefficients in these
regressions further evidence a possible connection between REFDI and ethnic conflict.
Since Asal et al.’s (2016) data codes binary variables for new ethnic conflict onsets I use
logistic regressions.

Model 6: (Logistic)
New ethnic war (binary) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents

Here we see that there are positive and statistically significant multiplicative interaction
effects between FDI and Oil on the chances of war. However, after including other
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explanatory variables used by Asal et al. (2016) the relationship becomes statistically
significant at only the 90% confidence level:

Model 7: (Logistic)
New ethnic war (binary) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents
+ excluded + downgraded + log group size + log population (lagged) + log GDP/capita
(lagged) + Presence of petroleum production + war history
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The results from this regression imply that we cannot reject the null that FDI inflows and
oil rents have no effect on the chances for ethnic conflict onset. Nevertheless, the mixed
results from all of the regressions imply that there still may be a connection and
Hypothesis 2 may still hold.

Analysis – Endogeneity Concerns
As noted, there exists a demonstrated negative correlation between war and FDI
and numerous studies show a causal connection from war to decreasing FDI. This makes
sense considering MNCs would not invest if they expect war to create negative returns on
investment. However, I am trying to observe any causal connections moving in the
opposite direction. Of course, then, endogeneity is a concern. Given the established
causal connection between war and less FDI, any positive effects of REFDI in these
regressions on war would be biased downwards and should be interpreted as lower
bounds.
As shown above, Model 5 also includes country fixed effects to partially account
for endogeneity. Countries with high FDI one year are likely to experience high FDI the
next all else equal since MNCs aim to make rational risk assessments year after year.
Using FE helps include this in the model leaving other explanatory variables to account
for exogenous shocks.
Additionally, in most regressions FDI inflows alone were negatively correlated
with conflict (as expected), but the interaction term was positive. If the interaction term is
an acceptable proxy for REFDI then this implies that for most forms of FDI war
correlates with lower FDI, but not necessarily for REFDI. This may be because resource
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extractionary MNCs can still receive positive returns on investment during ethnic conflict
and so are not as deterred by political instability. Or, it is because REFDI increases the
chances of ethnic conflict beyond MNC’s risk assessments. The stronger positive
relationship between REFDI (proxied) and the existence of ongoing war versus the onset
of new ethnic conflict evidences the latter relationship.
The difference between conflict onset and ongoing conflict existence also helps
evidence effects of REFDI. Assuming that the existence of violence increases the known
investment risk we would expect REFDI to decrease with ongoing conflict more so than
new conflict. The fact that REFDI correlates more positively with ongoing war suggests
that REFDI may exacerbate war. If there only existed a causal connection from war to
reduced REFDI then we would not see investments during ongoing wars.

Conclusion
The findings presented in the study are mixed. In the qualitative analysis of
Nigeria as a case study I show that REFDI has led to increased ethnic identification
among the Ijaw and Ogoni in the Niger Delta region that has led to increased violence.
Using SS13 as an initial framework I argue that REFDI constitutes increases to
contestable resources in Nigeria that incentivize less national identification and greater
ethnic identification. I also argue that the Nigerian government’s response has further
exacerbated tensions and led to increased violence.
The theoretical expectations of the model and Nigerian case study predict a
positive relationship between REFDI and ethnic conflict. The evidence from the
quantitative analysis, however, does not allow us to reject the null hypotheses that REFDI
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as no effect on ethnic conflict. Any effects of the proxy I use for REFDI in the models are
weak if statistically significant at all. The evidence does, however, suggest that there still
may be a connection between REFDI, social identity formation, and ethnic conflict as I
argue there exists in Nigeria, especially considering that political instability decreases
FDI and creates a downward bias on the coefficient estimates for REFDI.
This study is limited in its approach due to the lack of quantitative data on FDI by
country-sector-year, and by the until-recent lack of data on localized identity. As is,
regression models in the literature tend to report little explanatory power in general for
evidencing causal mechanisms, so the quantitative analysis here is intended more to
evidence the possibility of a causal relationship that I argue is apparent in the qualitative
analysis.
In order to more adequately assess these relationships further qualitative research
must be done in different countries and further qualitative research with localized surveys
should be used to see if oil production and/or REFDI correlates with stronger ethnic
identity and actual data on FDI inflows by sector-country-year should be used instead of
proxies. In the upcoming days I intend to use the new localized identity data in Nigeria to
see if the Niger Delta region, the area with the most REFDI and petroleum extraction also
has exhibited an increase in ethnic identification, as the theoretical expectations of the
model imply. I will include any results in a future appendix.
Aside from evidencing the need for more specific data, I argue that FDI may pose
hidden challenges for countries with heterogeneous identification. These states as well as
MNCs and the international community must be acutely aware of these challenges.
Policy should aim to limit the harm of REFDI to local communities and harness the
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wealth brought by REFDI for community development with fair wealth distribution to
incentivize a strong national identification. The relationships and causal mechanisms
relating to ethnic conflict, resource extraction, and foreign investment have only just
begun to be understood and I hope that this research highlights gaps in our knowledge
and offers possible answers.
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